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Abstract. In this paper I show that one cannot faithfully represent
contrary-to-duty obligations in logics with sanction semantics. In order
to do so I first provide a number of desiderata that a logic should satisfy in
order to represent contrary-to-duty obligations using sanction semantics.
I then show that no logic satisfying all desiderata can faithfully represent
contrary-to-duty obligations. Finally I show that when dropping any one
of the desiderata there is a logic that satisfies all others and can represent
some contrary-to-duty obligations faithfully.
1 Introduction
A well known problem in deontic logic is that of contrary-to-duty (CTD) obliga-
tions. CTD obligations are obligations that apply when breaking another obli-
gation; the CTD obligation is essentially a mitigating factor for the broken obli-
gation. The term was introduced in [1], where it was also shown that formalizing
CTD obligations is quite hard. Over the years a number of solutions to the prob-
lem of CTD obligations have been proposed, some more successful than others.
A reasonably complete overview can be found in [2] and [3].
One common approach in deontic logic is to capture obligations in terms of
a ‘sanction’. The idea, introduced in [4], is that you have an obligation to do φ,
denoted O(φ), if and only if there is some kind of ‘sanction’, denoted S, if you
do not do φ. This ‘sanction’ can be an actual punishment but it need not be,
in its most general form the ‘sanction’ merely represents the fact that ‘there is
wrongdoing’. Many deontic logics are either explicitly based on such a sanction
or can be described by it. The best known example of such logics is the so-called
Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) which can be given possible world semantics using
sanctions. Other examples include [5–9]. The strength of reducing obligations to
a sanction lies in its simplicity and intuitive plausibility; ‘you have an obligation
to do φ iff there is wrongdoing if you do not do φ’ sounds like a tautology.
Sanction based deontic logics are not however very successful in faithfully rep-
resenting CTD obligations. This is not surprising, as in a sanction based logic
there are only two possible degrees of goodness/badness: S and ¬S. Since a CTD
obligation is a mitigating factor for breaking an obligation one would expect that
faithfully representing it requires at least three degrees of goodness/badness: no
broken obligation, mitigated broken obligation and unmitigated broken obliga-
tion. This suggests that a straightforward reduction of obligations to sanction
cannot faithfully represent CTD obligations.
Several attempts have been made to represent CTD obligations in deontic
logics that use a more complicated reduction of obligations to sanction, such
as the logics SA [5], deontic modal action logic (DMAL) [6] and PDeL [9]. Un-
fortunately these logics all have problems that prevent them from faithfully
representing CTD obligations. A description of the problems with these logics is
given in Sect. 2.1 as it requires a more formal description of CTD obligations.
The inability of these logics to faithfully represent CTD obligations suggests
that it may be impossible to do so at all using sanction based logics even when
using complicated reductions of obligations to sanction. In this paper I show that
it is indeed impossible to faithfully represent CTD obligations in a logic with
sanction based semantics. In order to do this I define a number of desiderata
that any semantics should satisfy in order to represent CTD obligations using
sanction semantics. I then show that it is not possible to faithfully represent
CTD obligations with semantics satisfying these desiderata.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2 I give a definition of a
CTD obligation that is to be modeled, the well known gentle murder scenario.
In Sect. 3 I give some technical preliminaries that are needed to formulate the
desiderata. The desiderata are defined in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5 I prove that there is
no logic that satisfies all the desiderata and faithfully models the gentle murder
scenario. Finally, in Sect. 6 I show that when dropping any one desideratum
there is a logic that satisfies the remaining desiderata and faithfully models the
gentle murder scenario.
2 The Gentle Murder Scenario
In stead of giving a general form for all CTD obligations and then checking
whether the general form can be represented in a logic we will consider a specific
CTD obligation. If a logic is incapable of faithfully representing the specific CTD
obligation it is certainly incapable of representing CTD obligations in general.
The CTD obligation we consider is due to [10]. Consider the following situ-
ation: at some point in time you have the choice whether or not to murder. If
you do murder you simultaneously have the choice whether to murder gently or
un-gently. I hope we can all agree that you have an obligation not to murder. Let
us write m for ‘you murder’, then we can represent this obligation as O(¬m).1
If you would decide to murder anyway then you are doing something wrong,
but you can slightly mitigate your action by murdering gently; you have a CTD
obligation to murder gently if you murder. Let us write g for ‘you murder gently’
1 Here I let obligations apply to actions, such as murdering. But I could equivalently
let obligations apply to states of affairs, such as the one where someone is murdered.
and O(g|m) for the CTD obligation to murder gently. I refer to this situation as
the gentle murder scenario.2
If the scenario included only these two obligations it would be trivially solv-
able, for example by saying that everything is obligatory. In order to faithfully
model the scenario a few more statements must hold: a gentle murder is still a
very bad thing so there must be an obligation O(¬g), there is no obligation to
murder so ¬O(m) and there is no CTD obligation to murder un-gently if you
murder so ¬O(¬g|m). Let Ψ be the set of statements that should hold in the
gentle murder scenario, Ψ = {O(¬m),¬O(m), O(¬g), O(g|m),¬O(¬g|m)}.3
2.1 Problems with some existing formalizations of CTD obligations
As mentioned in the introduction three attempts to formalize CTD obligations
using sanction based semantics are the logics SA [5], DMAL [6] and PDeL [9].
These three logics are especially instructive because they each suffer from a
different problem in formalizing CTD obligations.
PDeL cannot represent the gentle murder scenario at all. A CTD obligation
O(g|m) can only be represented in PDeL as “if you m then you should subse-
quently g”, but murdering and murdering gently do not happen in sequence.
In SA an obligation O(¬m) implies that S holds in both the m∧¬g and m∧g
cases. This leaves no way to deontically distinguish m∧¬g and m∧ g so a CTD
obligation O(g|m) usually4 cannot occur without an opposite CTD obligation
O(¬g|m).
In DMAL a CTD obligation O(g|m) implies that S does not hold after either
¬m or g. This leaves no way to deontically distinguish ¬m and g. In particular,
the obligation O(g|m) implies a permission P (g) to murder gently.
3 The Semantic Approach
The approach to logic taken here is a semantic one and more precisely a possible
world semantics one. For this purpose the following definition will suffice.
Definition 1. A logic L is a triple L = (M, Φ, |=) whereM is a class of models,
Φ is a set of formulas and |= is a satisfaction relation such that
– there are a countable subset P ⊆ Φ of propositional variables and one desig-
nated variable S ∈ P ,
– Φ is closed under the unary operator ¬ and the binary operator →,
2 The situation in combination with a few other statements is usually referred to as
the paradox of the gentle murderer or Forrester’s paradox. The paradox however
depends on a factual statement that m holds. I make no such assumption here so
there is no paradox.
3 Note that there is no requirement for ¬O(g) to hold. This leaves open the possibility
for the logic to satisfy some form of detachment from O(g|m).
4 The unusual case is if it is impossible to murder gently.
– every M∈M is a triple M = (W,R, v) where W is a set of possible worlds,
R is a set and v : P → ℘(W ) is a valuation function,
– |= is a relation between model-world pairs (M, w) and formulas φ, where
M = (W,R, v) ∈M, w ∈W and φ ∈ Φ,
– for every M, w and p ∈ P it holds that M, w |= p iff w ∈ v(p),
– for every M, w and φ ∈ Φ it holds that M, w |= ¬φ iff M, w 6|= φ.
– for every M, w and φ1, φ2 ∈ Φ it holds that if M, w |= φ1 → φ2 and
M, w |= φ1 then M, w |= φ2.
The set R is left unspecified and can be used to encode additional structure
such as an accessibility relation or a set of agents. The exact contents of R are
irrelevant for present purposes. We say that φ holds or is true in w on M if
M, w |= φ and use a few common notations.
Definition 2. For any M = (W,R, V ) ∈M, w ∈W , φ ∈ Φ and Γ ⊆ Φ:
– The set JφKM is given by JφKM := {w ∈W | M, w |= φ}.
– Γ holds in w on M, denoted M, w |= Γ if M, w |= φ for all φ ∈ Γ .
– The set JΓ KM is given by JΓ KM := {w ∈W | M, w |= Γ}.
– φ is valid on M, denoted M |= φ, if M, w |= φ for all w ∈W .
Now let us consider what it means for a logic L = (M, Φ, |=) to be capable
of modeling the gentle murder scenario. Firstly the logic should be capable of
representing the obligations under consideration. I formalize this as Ψ ⊆ Φ, but
the formulas in Ψ may be considered as abbreviations for other formulas. For
example, we could use O(g|m) as an abbreviation for O(m → g) or m → O(g).
Secondly, there should be a model MO = (WO, RO, vO) ∈ M representing the
scenario and a world wO ∈ WO where the obligations hold, so MO, wO |= Ψ .
Furthermore, the propositional variables m and g should represent murder and
gentle murder respectively in this modelMO. We cannot enforce such a meaning,
except for the part that a gentle murder is still a murder so MO |= g → m.
However, if the logic has this one ‘canonical’ representation of the gentle
murder scenario then it also has other representations of the scenario. We could
for example write n instead of m for ‘you murder’ and still have a representation.
Each such representation can be seen as a tuple (M, w, Γ, χ) whereM is a model,
w is a world in the model, Γ is a set of formulas corresponding to Ψ and χ is a
formula corresponding to g → m such that M, w |= Γ and M |= χ.
We will need to consider both the class G of such tuples and the ‘canonical’
representation (MO, wO, Ψ, g → m) ∈ G.
Definition 3. Let L be a logic, MO a model, wO a world in the model and G
a class of tuples (M, w, Γ, ψ) where M = (W,R, v) ∈M, w ∈W , Γ ⊆ Φ, ψ ∈ Φ
and M |= ψ. Then
– the tuple (L,MO, wO, G) models the gentle murder scenario if (MO, wO,
Ψ, g → m) ∈ G and
– the tuple (L,MO, wO, G) faithfully models the gentle murder scenario if it
models the gentle murder scenario and furthermore M, w |= Γ for every
(M, w, Γ, ψ) ∈ G.
Definition 4. A logic L (faithfully) models the gentle murder scenario if there
areMO, wO and G such that (L,MO, wO, G) (faithfully) models the gentle mur-
der scenario.
4 Desiderata
In order for a logic to represent CTD obligations with sanction semantics it
should have certain properties, given here as desiderata. The desiderata should
hold in general, but in some cases formally defining the desideratum in general
is very hard. In order to give a reasonably simple definition I therefore restrict
some of the desiderata to the representations G of the gentle murder scenario
or even the canonical representation (MO, wO, Ψ, g → m) of the gentle murder
scenario. If it is not possible to faithfully model the gentle murder scenario while
satisfying the restricted form of the desiderata it is also impossible to do so while
satisfying the general form of the desiderata.
Invariance under propositional renaming. We use the propositional vari-
ables m and g for the statements ‘you murder’ and ‘you murder gently’. But
of course we could use any other two variables. If not committing murder is
obligatory it should remain obligatory if we use the variable r instead of m
for ‘you murder’. More generally, renaming any propositional variable other
than the designated variable S should not change the truth value of any
formula as long as the appropriate substitution is applied to the formula.
Likewise, replacing a propositional variable other than S by its negation
should not change anything. If we use m for ‘you murder’ there is an obliga-
tion O(¬m) not to murder. Then if we instead use m for ‘you do not murder’
(and therefore ¬m for ‘you murder’) there should still be an obligation not
to murder, although it is then denoted O(m).
In order to formalize this let us first introduce a notation [p/q] and [p/¬p]
for renaming p to q or to ¬p respectively.
Definition 5. For M = (W,R, v) ∈ M and p, q ∈ P define v[p/q] and
v[p/¬p] by
v[p/q](r) :=




v(r) if r 6= p
W \ v(p) if r = p
and M[p/φ] by
M[p/φ] := (W,R, v[p/φ])
for φ ∈ {q,¬p}. Furthermore, for φ ∈ Φ define φ[p/q] to be the formula
obtained by simultaneously replacing all occurrences of p in φ by q and all
occurrences of q by p and define φ[p/¬p] to be the formula obtained by re-
placing all occurrences of p in φ by ¬p.
Using this notation we can easily give a formalization of the desideratum.
Desideratum 1 (Invariance under propositional renaming). For any
M = (W,R, v) ∈M, any w ∈W , any φ ∈ Φ and any p, q ∈ P \ {S} it holds
that
M, w |= φ⇔M[p/q], w |= φ[p/q] and
M, w |= φ⇔M[p/¬p], w |= φ[p/¬p]
Note that since |= is a relation between pairs (M, w) where M ∈ M and
formulas φ ∈ Φ the desideratum implies that M[p/q], M[p/¬p] ∈ M and
φ[p/q], φ[p/¬p] ∈ Φ. Similar claims are implicit in the other desiderata.
Determinacy of sanction. The sanction S should represent the presence or
absence of wrongdoing. Whether there is wrongdoing in a world should be
fully determined by the truth values of the deontically relevant formulas in
that world. What exactly the deontically relevant formulas are is determined
by what one is modeling.
In the gentle murder scenario the formulas m and g are obviously deontically
relevant, but one could argue that there are other relevant formulas such as
for example a formula c corresponding to ‘you covet your neighbor’s house’.
Such a formula c can undeniably have deontic relevance in some systems of
rules. It should however be possible to represent the rule system that is de-
scribed in the gentle murder scenario, which only has rules about murdering
and murdering gently.
The rule system that only contains rules about murdering and murdering
gently can be seen as a canonical rule system for the gentle murder scenario,
so it seems reasonable to require the model MO to correspond to this par-
ticular system. The desideratum thus becomes a requirement that the value
of S in a world of MO is fully determined by the values m and g on that
world.
Desideratum 2 (Determinacy of sanction). For every w1, w2 ∈ WO
such that w1 ∈ vO(m) ⇔ w2 ∈ vO(m) and w1 ∈ vO(g) ⇔ w2 ∈ vO(g) it
holds that w1 ∈ vO(S)⇔ w2 ∈ vO(S).
Range of outcomes. When considering a CTD obligation there is a number
of possible outcomes. The gentle murder scenario for example has three out-
comes: an un-gentle murder (m and ¬g), a gentle murder (m and g) and no
murder (¬m and ¬g). The possible outcomes should be represented in the
model of the scenario.
We could require the model to have exactly one world for each outcome, but
that seems too strong a requirement. Consider for example the use of a new
variable r for ‘it is raining’. The combination of m, g and r cannot occur
in the same world as m, g and ¬r but they are part of the same outcome,
the gentle murder. A better requirement is therefore that there is at least
one world in each outcome. For the gentle murder scenario this gives the
following desideratum.
Desideratum 3 (Range of outcomes). There exist w1, w2, w3 ∈ WO
such that MO, w1 |= {m,¬g}, MO, w2 |= {m, g} and MO, w3 |= {¬m,¬g}.
Invariance under act renaming. We use the propositional variables m and
g for ‘you murder’ and ‘you murder gently’. But we could describe the same
situation using different acts, for example by writing m for ‘you murder’ and
u for ‘you murder un-gently’. Changing the names of acts in such a way does
not change the situation that is described, so the logic should be insensitive
to such renaming.
It is important to note that act renaming is not the same as propositional
renaming, ¬u is not equivalent to g as g is necessarily a murder while ¬u
need not be. It is not clear whether under such conditions it should in general
hold that a conditional obligation O(g|m) implies a conditional obligation
O(¬u|m). However, in this particular case it is clear that a conditional obli-
gation O(¬u|m) should hold; if you murder you have an obligation not to do
so un-gently. Similarly there is no obligation to murder un-gently if you mur-
der ¬O(u|m). The obligation O(¬g) not to murder gently does not however
change into an obligation O(u) to murder un-gently, but into an obligation
O(¬u) not to murder un-gently.
This kind of act renaming can also be done without changing the variable
used. If g represents murdering gently and we want to change it to represent-
ing murdering un-gently we should change the value of g where m holds, but
not where ¬m holds. Let us denote by v[p/¬p|φ] the valuation obtained by
changing the value of p on JφKM worlds while keeping it constant on J¬φKM.
Definition 6. For M = (W,R, v), p ∈ P and φ ∈ Φ define v[p/¬p|φ] by
v[p/¬p|φ](r) :=
{
v(r) if r 6= p
((W \ JφKM) ∩ v(p)) ∪ (JφKM ∩ (W \ v(p))) if r = p
Furthermore, define M[p/¬p|φ] by M[p/¬p|φ] := (W,R, v[p/¬p|φ]).
The desideratum can then be given as follows.
Desideratum 4 (Invariance under act renaming). Let
Ψ [g/¬g|m] = {O(¬m),¬O(m), O(¬g), O(¬g|m),¬O(g|m)}.
Then for any M and w such that (M, w, Ψ, g → m) ∈ G it holds that
(M[g/¬g|m], w, Ψ [g/¬g|m], g → m) ∈ G.
Invariance under outcome renaming. When using sanction semantics the
moral status of an outcome depends only on the value of S in the outcome
as opposed to for example a preference order between the outcomes. As
such, the outcomes should “be treated the same way” when determining the
relevant obligations. One way of stating this is that if we interchange the
values of the propositional variables on different outcomes this should have
no influence on the obligations in effect.
Unfortunately, there is a problem with interchanging the values on differ-
ent outcomes. Since different outcomes may contain different numbers of
worlds it can be impossible to completely interchange them. The values of
the relevant variables are however constant in a given outcome, so we can in-
terchange the values of the relevant variables. This may result in the change
of some morally irrelevant facts in the outcomes, but this doesn’t matter as
these facts are morally irrelevant.
Definition 7. For M = (W,R, v) and Γ ⊆ {m, g,S} define WMΓ to be the
set of worlds in which the variables in Γ are true and those in {m, g, S} \ Γ
are false,
WMΓ := {w ∈W | ∀p ∈ Γ : w ∈ v(p) and ∀p ∈ {m, g, S} \ Γ : w 6∈ v(p)}.
Furthermore, for Γ,Θ ⊆ {m, g, S} define v[WMΓ /WMΘ ] to be the valuation






v(p) if p 6∈ Γ and p 6∈ Θ
(v(p) ∪WMΓ ) \WMΘ if p 6∈ Γ and p ∈ Θ
(v(p) ∪WMΘ ) \WMΓ if p ∈ Γ and p 6∈ Θ
v(p) if p ∈ Γ and p ∈ Θ
and
M[WMΓ /WMΘ ] := (W,R, v[WMΓ /WMΘ ])
Now we can formalize the desideratum for the gentle murder scenario.
Desideratum 5 (Invariance under outcome renaming). For any Γ,Θ
⊆ {m, g,S}, M = (W,R, v) and w such that (M, w, Ψ, g → m), WMΓ 6= ∅
and WMΘ 6= ∅ it holds that (M[WMΓ /WMΘ ], w, Ψ, g → m) ∈ G.
These desiderata are rather weak, so complicated and ‘strange’ semantics are
allowed as long as they are based on the use of a sanction. Logics that satisfy the
desiderata (for an appropriate choice of G, MO and wO) include the possible
world semantics for SDL as well as the systems presented in for example [5, 7].
The main weakness of the desiderata is that they do not apply to dynamic
deontic logics where m and g would be labels of transitions between possible
worlds as opposed to propositional variables, such as the logics described in [6,
9]. This is mostly a matter of notation, the desiderata could be rephrased to
apply to dynamic deontic logics and an impossibility result similar to the one
obtained with the current desiderata could be reached. Including the dynamic
version of the desiderata would however greatly complicate the notation of the
desiderata without significant conceptual changes so I do not do so.
5 Impossibility Result
Theorem 1. There are no logic (M, Φ, |=), class G of tuples, model MO =
(WO, RO, vO) ∈ M and world wO ∈ WO that satisfy desiderata 1 to 5 and
faithfully model the gentle murder scenario.
Proof. Suppose that there are such logic (M, Φ, |=), class G of tuples, model
MO = (WO, RO, vO) ∈M and world wO ∈WO.
Let X1 = J{m,¬g}KMO , X2 = J{m, g}KMO and X3 = J{¬m,¬g}KMO . We
have X1 ∪ X2 ∪ X3 = WO because (MO, wO, Ψ, g → m) ∈ G and therefore
MO |= g → m. Furthermore, as a consequence of the Range of outcomes
desideratum X1, X2 and X3 are nonempty and by the Determinacy of sanc-
tion desideratum the value of S is constant inside each of the three sets, so
X1, X2 and X3 are of the form W
MO
Γ for some Γ ⊆ {m, g, S}, see Definition 7.
Suppose X1 and X2 have the same value for S. Then interchanging the val-
uations of X1 and X2 results in the same model as changing the meaning of g
to ‘you murder un-gently’. That is, MO[X1/X2] =MO[g/¬g|m].
Example 1. If X1 and X2 have the same value for S it does not matter where
S holds. In order to illustrate why MO[X1/X2] = MO[g/¬g|m] it is however
convenient to take a concrete example, so consider the case where S holds on
X1 and X2 but not on X3, see Fig. 1. Then v
O(m) = vO(S) = X1 ∪ X2 and
vO(g) = X2. If we switch the valuations of X1 and X2 we get v
O[X1/X2](m) =
vO[X1/X2](S) = X1 ∪X2 and vO[X1/X2](g) = X1.
If we change the meaning of g to murdering un-gently we get vO[g/¬g|m](m)
= vO[g/¬g|m](S) = X1∪X2 and vO[g/¬g|m](g) = X1. So we have vO[X1/X2] =
v[g/¬g|m] and therefore MO[X1/X2] =MO[g/¬g|m].
MO
X1 : m,¬g,S X2 : m, g,S X3 : ¬m,¬g,¬S
MO
X1 : m,¬g, S X2 : m,g, S X3 : ¬m,¬g,¬S
X1 : m, g,S X2 : m,¬g,S X3 : ¬m,¬g,¬S
MO[X1/X2]










Fig. 1. If X1 and X2 have the same value for S then interchanging X1 and X2 has the
same result as changing the meaning of g to ‘you murder un-gently’.
By the Invariance under outcome renaming desideratum it holds that
(MO[X1/X2], wO, Ψ, g → m) ∈ G. The gentle murder scenario is faithfully mod-
eled, so MO[X1/X2], wO |= Ψ and in particular MO[X1/X2], wO 6|= O(¬g|m).
By Invariance under act renaming it also holds that (MO[g/¬g|m], wO,
Ψ [g/¬g|m], g → m) ∈ G so MO[g/¬g|m], wO |= Ψ [g/¬g|m] by the faithful
modeling and in particular MO[g/¬g|m], wO |= O(¬g|m). But M[X1/X2] =
M[g/¬g|m] and the formula cannot be both true and false. The assumption
that X1 and X2 have the same value for S is therefore false.
Now suppose that X1 and X3 have the same value for S. Then first inter-
changing the valuations of X1 and X3 and subsequently changing the meaning of
g to murdering un-gently results in the same model as first changing the mean-
ing of g to murdering un-gently, then renaming both m and g to their negations
and finally renaming m and g to each other. That is, MO[X1/X3][g/¬g|m] =
MO[g/¬g|m][g/¬g][m/¬m][g/m].
Example 2. As another concrete example consider the case where S holds on X1
and X3 but not on X2, see Fig. 2. Then v
O(m) = X1 ∪ X2, vO(g) = X2 and
vO(S) = X1 ∪X3. Interchanging the valuations for X1 and X3 we get
vO(p)[X1/X3] =

X2 ∪X3 if p = m
X2 if p = g
X1 ∪X3 if p = S
vO(p) otherwise.
If we subsequently change the meaning of g to murdering un-gently we get
vO(p)[X1/X3][g/¬g|m] =

X2 ∪X3 if p = m
X3 if p = g
X1 ∪X3 if p = S
vO(p) otherwise.
If we start at vO and change the meaning of g to murdering un-gently we get
vO[g/¬g|m](p) =

X1 ∪X2 if p = m
X1 if p = g
X1 ∪X3 if p = S
vO(p) otherwise.
If we then rename m and g to their negations we get
vO[g/¬g|m][g/¬g][m/¬m](p) =

X3 if p = m
X2 ∪X3 if p = g
X1 ∪X3 if p = S
vO(p) otherwise.
Subsequently renaming m and g to each other gives
vO[g/¬g|m][g/¬g][m/¬m][g/m](p) =

X2 ∪X3 if p = m
X3 if p = g
X1 ∪X3 if p = S
vO(p) otherwise,
so vO[X1/X3][g/¬g|m] = vO[g/¬g|m][g/¬g][m/¬m][g/m].
By the Invariance under outcome renaming desideratum it holds that
(MO[X1/X3], wO, Ψ, g → m) ∈ G, and then by the Invariance under act
renaming desideratum that (MO[X1/X3][g/¬g|m], wO, Ψ [g/¬g|m], g → m) ∈
G. This implies that MO[X1/X3][g/¬g|m], wO |= Ψ [g/¬g|m] so in particular
MO[X1/X3][g/¬g|m], wO |= O(¬g).
However, by the Invariance under act renaming desideratum it also
holds that (MO[g/¬g|m], wO, Ψ [g/¬g|m], g → m) ∈ G. So MO[g/¬g|m], wO |=
MO
X1 : m,¬g,S X2 : m, g,¬S X3 : ¬m,¬g, S
MO
X1 : m,¬g, S X2 : m, g,¬S X3 : ¬m,¬g,S
X1 : ¬m,¬g,S X2 : m, g,¬S X3 : m,¬g, S
MO[X1/X3]
X1 : m, g,S X2 : m,¬g,¬S X3 : ¬m,¬g,S
MO[g/¬g|m]
X1 : ¬m,¬g,S X2 : m,¬g,¬S X3 : m,g, S
MO[X1/X3][g/¬g|m]
X1 : ¬m,¬g, S X2 : ¬m, g,¬S X3 : m, g,S
MO[g/¬g|m][g/¬g][m/¬m]








































Fig. 2. If X1 and X3 have the same value for S then interchanging X1 and X3 followed
by changing the meaning of g to murdering un-gently has the same result as first
changing the meaning of g to murdering un-gently, then renaming m and g to their
negations and finally renaming m and g to each other.
Ψ [g/¬g|m] and in particularMO[g/¬g|m], wO 6|= O(m). By repeated application
of the Invariance under propositional renaming desideratum it can then
be seen that MO[g/¬g|m][g/¬g][m/¬m][g/m], wO 6|= O(m)[g/¬g][m/¬m][g/m]
so MO[g/¬g|m][g/¬g][m/¬m][g/m], wO 6|= O(¬g).
But MO[X1/X3][g/¬g|m] = MO[g/¬g|m][g/¬g][m/¬m][g/m], and O(¬g)
cannot be both true and false. The assumption that X1 and X3 have the same
value for S must therefore be false.
Finally, suppose X2 and X3 have the same value for S. Then first inter-
changing X2 and X3 and then renaming m and g to each other has the same
result as renaming m and g to their negations. That is, MO[X2/X3][m/g] =
MO[g/¬g][m/¬m].
Example 3. As a concrete example consider the case where S holds on X2 and
X3 but not on X1, see Fig. 3. Then v
O(m) = X1∪X2, vO(g) = X2 and vO(S) =
X2 ∪X3. Interchanging X2 and X3 we get
vO[X2/X3](p) =

X1 ∪X3 if p = m
X3 if p = g
X2 ∪X3 if p = S
vO(p) otherwise.
Subsequently renaming m and g to each other gives
vO[X2/X3][m/g](p) =

X3 if p = m
X1 ∪X3 if p = g
X2 ∪X3 if p = S
vO(p) otherwise.




X3 if p = m
X1 ∪X3 if p = g
X2 ∪X3 if p = S
vO(p) otherwise,
so vO[X2/X3][m/g] = v
O[g/¬g][m/¬m].
MO
X1 : m,¬g,¬S X2 : m, g,S X3 : ¬m,¬g, S
MO
X1 : m,¬g,¬S X2 : m,g, S X3 : ¬m,¬g,S
X1 : m,¬g,¬S X2 : ¬m,¬g, S X3 : m,g, S
MO[X2/X3]
X1 : ¬m, g,¬S X2 : ¬m,¬g,S X3 : m, g,S
MO[g/¬g][m/¬m]

































Fig. 3. If X2 and X3 have the same value for S then interchanging X1 and X3 followed
by renaming m and g to each other has the same result as renaming m and g to their
negations.
By the Invariance under outcome renaming desideratum it holds that
(MO[X2/X3], wO, Ψ,m → g) ∈ G. This implies that MO[X2/X3], wO |= Ψ so
in particular MO[X2/X3], wO |= O(¬g). By the Invariance under propo-
sitional renaming desideratum it then holds that MO[X2/X3][m/g], wO |=
O(¬g)[m/g] so MO[X2/X3][m/g], wO |= O(¬m).
However, (MO, wO, Ψ,m → g) ∈ G so MO, wO |= Ψ and in particular
MO, wO 6|= O(m). This implies MO[g/¬g][m/¬m], wO 6|= O(m)[g/¬g][m/¬m]
by Invariance under propositional renaming, soMO[g/¬g][m/¬m], wO 6|=
O(¬m).
But MO[X2/X3][m/g] = MO[g/¬g][m/¬m] and O(¬m) cannot be both
true and false. The assumption that X2 and X3 have the same value for S must
therefore be false.
We have obtained the results that X1 and X2 cannot have the same value
for S, that X1 and X3 cannot have the same value for S and that X2 and X3
cannot have the same value for S. This cannot happen since there are only two
possible values for S. The assumption that there are a logic (M, Φ, |=), class G
of tuples, model MO = (WO, RO, vO) ∈ M and world wO ∈ WO such that
(MO, wO, Ψ, g → m) ∈ G and desiderata 1 to 5 are satisfied must therefore be
false, which proves the theorem. uunionsq
6 Relaxing the Desiderata
Having established that we cannot find semantics that faithfully model the gentle
murder scenario and satisfy all the desiderata it seems worthwhile to consider
what happens if we drop one of the desiderata. Dropping any of the desiderata
allows us to faithfully model the gentle murder scenario while satisfying the
remaining desiderata, although for most of the desiderata the logic in question
is not very useful.
6.1 Dropping Invariance under Propositional Renaming
If we drop the Invariance under propositional renaming desideratum we
can model the gentle murder scenario by giving special treatment to m, letting
O(¬m) and ¬O(m) always be true and using S only to determine the moral value
of g. The semantics for O(φ|m) could then for example be M, w |= O(φ|m) ⇔
M |= ¬φ→ S. Such a logic does not seem very useful, however.
6.2 Dropping Determinacy of Sanction
If we drop the Determinacy of sanction desideratum we can model the gentle
murder scenario by having S true on all m and ¬g worlds, false on all ¬m worlds
and true on some but not all m and g worlds. Effectively this creates a third
degree of badness in between ‘always S’ and ‘never S’.
This solution does not however generalize to situations where more than
three degrees of badness are needed such as situations with multiple mitigating
factors. In order to create more than three degrees of badness we would have
to give relevance to exactly how often S holds. But because of the Invariance
under outcome renaming desideratum we can interchange any number of
worlds of one outcome with any number of worlds of another outcome so the
exact number of worlds in a given outcome cannot be relevant.
6.3 Dropping Range of Outcomes
Dropping the Range of outcomes desideratum allows us to model the gentle
murder scenario, by using nonexistence of an outcome as a heavier sanction than
S. This leads to a model with two worlds, one with m, g and S and one with
¬m,¬g and ¬S, with semantics given by M, w |= O(φ) ⇔ M |= ¬φ → S and
M, w |= O(ψ|φ)⇔ (M, w |= O(¬φ) and M 6|= ¬(ψ ∧ ¬φ)).
Under these semantics all the obligations from Ψ are satisfied, but also some
obligations one would prefer not to have in a model of the gentle murder scenario
such as O(m|g). The method also doesn’t generalize well to more complicated
contrary-to-duty obligations.
6.4 Dropping Invariance under Act Renaming
If we drop the Invariance under act renaming desideratum we can give
deontic relevance to whether we discuss murdering gently or murdering un-gently.
Whether we use g for murdering gently or for murdering un-gently, ¬g will
hold in the ¬m worlds. This ¬g can then be set as the default action, which
we can consider either a pessimistic default or an optimistic default. If it is a
pessimistic default the contrary-to-duty obligation when murdering is to make
the default false, if it is an optimistic default the contrary-to-duty obligation
is to make the default true. The semantics of the pessimistic default could for
example be given by M, w |= O(φ|ψ)⇔M |= O(¬ψ) ∧ (¬ψ → ¬φ).
This method of setting defaults allows us to faithfully model the gentle mur-
der scenario and certain generalizations of it, but not every CTD obligation.
6.5 Dropping Invariance under Outcome Renaming
If we drop the Invariance under outcome renaming desideratum we can
simply use the additional structure R of a model M = (W,R, v) to encode
obligations, for example by letting R be a partial order on the worlds.
Contrary-to-duty obligations on models where a preference between the pos-
sible worlds is given by a partial order are well studied, see for example [11] for
an overview.
6.6 Using multiple sanctions
One more way to formalize the gentle murder scenario is to use multiple sanc-
tions S1,S2, · · · . This would require modifications to the Invariance under
propositional renaming, Determinacy of sanction and Invariance un-
der outcome renaming desiderata, as the special status of S would have to
be extended to all sanctions.
Any number greater than 1 of sanctions would allow us to faithfully rep-
resent the gentle murder scenario while satisfying all (modified) desiderata. A
finite number of sanctions can only model a finite number of different degrees of
badness however, and is therefore incapable of faithfully representing obligations
with more than a certain number of mitigating factors.
Using an infinite number of sanctions would allow us to faithfully model
every CTD obligation but lacks the simplicity that makes sanction semantics
so attractive. In fact, the simplest way to represent arbitrary obligations using
an infinite number of sanctions is probably to use a preference order on the
sanctions and let the possible worlds inherit this order, thus reducing the use of
sanctions to the use of a preference relation on the possible worlds.
7 Conclusion
A logic modeling the gentle murder scenario using sanction semantics can be
expected to satisfy the Invariance under propositional renaming, Deter-
minacy of sanction, Range of outcomes, Invariance under act renaming
and Invariance under outcome renaming desiderata. Several such logics ex-
ist; examples include SA of [5], XSTIT of [7] and a common semantics for SDL.
It is not possible for a logic to faithfully model the gentle murder scenario
while satisfying all the desiderata. If we drop any one of the desiderata a logic can
be found that faithfully models the gentle murder scenario while satisfying all
remaining desiderata, although most such logics are not very useful. An exception
is the logic using a preference relation on the possible worlds, which satisfies all
desiderata except Invariance under outcome renaming and seems capable
of faithfully modeling any CTD obligation. This logic can hardly be considered
to be based on sanction semantics, however.
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